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Abstract
We present a mobile app solution to help the containment of an epidemic outbreak by keeping track of possible
infections in the incubation period. We consider the particular case of an infection which primarily spreads among
people through proximal contact, via respiratory droplets. This smartphone application will be able to detect other
devices in close proximity and list all the interactions in an anonymous and encrypted way. If an app user is tested
positive and so is certified as infected, the application notifies immediately the potential contagion to the devices in
the list and suggests to start a voluntary quarantine and undergo a medical test. We believe this solution may be
particularly useful in the current COVID-19 pandemic and moreover could be used to prevent similar events in the
future.
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1. Introduction
What we can learn from the recent COVID-19 pandemic
is that we were not ready for this kind of eventuality.[1]
Our society has reached a level of global interconnec-
tion which makes an epidemic outbreak an event very
problematic to contain with traditional quarantine mea-
sures. This means that a very contagious disease can
easily spread around the globe putting health care sys-
tems under pressure, especially in countries where such
systems are already in precarious conditions.
Therefore, it is necessary to find a way to effectively
limit pandemics as soon as possible.
Nowadays, especially in the most technologically devel-
oped areas, a vast majority of people own a smartphone
and have it constantly with themselves. This type of
behavior is typical of our current lifestyle and can rep-
resent an advantage to contain the epidemic outbreak.
An infectious disease primarily spreads among people
due to their proximity, via respiratory droplets coming
from coughs and sneezes or via direct contact.[3]
In order to slow down the outbreak, the best procedure
is to immediately identify the ”patient zero” and quar-
antine those who have come into contact with them. [4]
The recent outbreak of COVID-19 showed that this ap-
proach is difficult to pursue and unsustainable when the
incubation period is long, because of the high number of
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interactions and the lack of strategies to efficiently warn
the people who could have gotten infected.
The absence of an efficient method to track the spread of
the epidemic may translate into an exponential growth
of cases, and this, in turn, might lead to a pandemic
which is hard to contain without severe restrictions on
people’s freedom.
Figure 1: Conceptual comparison between the adaptive confinement
with respect to the classic confinement localized in a defined area.
We propose a relatively simple but powerful tool, based
on an smartphone application, to statistically slow down
and contain an epidemic outbreak.
The main idea is to treat each ”positive patient” like the
”patient zero” using a smartphone contact tracing strat-
egy. This approach can be called ”selective quarantine”
and contrasts with the ”traditional quarantine” which
consists in isolating a geographical area (see Fig1).
This smartphone application should be able to track
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other devices in close proximity and to encrypt all the
interactions into an anonymous ”proximal contact list”.
In the case where a patient is infected, the medical au-
thority provides a key to activate the app, which sends
automatic notifications to the devices on the list, warn-
ing about the possible contagion.
2. Description of the Proximity app
In this section we describe the workflow of the proposed
smartphone application, that we named Proximity [8] ,
together with its main technical features and further de-
velopment.
2.1. Main features
The application works in two different modalities. One
is the Tracking mode, which runs in background and en-
ables the recording of devices in close proximity. The
other is the Alert mode, which is activated only when
the infection is identified and allows the device to send
alerts to other potentially infected individuals.
Proximity, in the Tracking mode, should be able to:
1. track all short range (distance of 2 − 3m) interac-
tions between people with a smartphone with the
same app installed, as illustrated in Fig.(2).
2. save at least the following information: date, time
and the duration of the interaction, and the phone-
number of all the interacting mobile phones.
3. keep in the local memory a list (proximal contact
list) of all the interactions occurred in a time du-
ration at least equal to the incubation period of the
infection.
4. be switched to the Alert mode, by inserting an ac-
tivation key.
In the case a person is tested positive for the infection,
the medical authority who certified the test, provides the
key Km to activate the Alert mode. This key is a one-
time password generated by an algorithm in a protected
web page where only doctors with certified emails can
access. The medical authority can generate the key Km
introducing the user ID, provided by the patient, in the
online key generator. Subsequently, the Km key is used
by the patient to activate the Alert mode.
Once the Alert mode has been activated, the app will:
1. send an SMS notification to all the contacts in the
proximal contact list.
2. alert all the devices receiving the notification from
the activated one, in order to warn about the pos-
sible contagion. The alert should contain precise
directions on the actions to be taken (e.g. undergo
a test and/or start a voluntary quarantine).
The complete Proximity workflow is depicted in Fig.(3).
The crucial feature of Proximity is the tracking of neigh-
boring devices. This must occur offline and with high
accuracy, for the measurement of the distance. The for-
mer requirement will ensure the users’ privacy, as all
the information will be stored locally in the device, in
an encrypted form.
Moreover, it will allow the app to operate even if the
connection to the network is missing or weak. The
range accuracy is crucial, in order to avoid having a
large number of false alerts. With false alerts we mean
devices recorded in the proximal contact list, which
were out of the infection range (i.e. the maximum
distance at which one can be infected by proximity).
Clearly the closer the tracking range is to the infection
range, the higher the identification accuracy of poten-
tially infected people will be.
Figure 2: Illustrative sketch which shows how Proximity should work
and keep track of all short range (2-3 m) interactions.
We identified the Bluetooth technology as the most
suitable option to satisfy the app’s needs. Bluetooth al-
lows for the direct communication of one device with
multiple others, even out of the line-of-sight, thus en-
abling simultaneously tracking of multiple smartphones
within the selected range. Furthermore, it is designed
for low power consumption, enabling the app to be con-
stantly active, without draining the battery.
Another crucial parameter is the working range, in or-
der to provide the required accuracy. Current Bluetooth
(Class 2) devices operating on mobile phones have a
range of about 10 meters[5], variable depending on the
presence of obstacles along the path, which can atten-
uate the signal. The infection range is usually on the
order of a few meters, so Bluetooth antennas are a vi-
able tool for this application.[5]
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Figure 3: The diagram summarizes how Proximity app works. On the left in the Tracking mode and on the right in Alert mode.
One potentially interesting alternative to Bluetooth,
would be Near Field Communication (NFC). This is
a pretty recent technology implemented in most novel
devices, which allows for radio communication on very
short distances, used for example for wireless payments.
This is promising for Proximity since it is a very low
power consuming technology.[6] The drawback is the
range, which currently is in the order of few centimeters,
thus making it unsuitable for our app, for the moment.
2.2. Further development
After listing above the main operating features of our
Proximity app, we propose here some further refine-
ments. These improvements might help addressing
some collateral issues linked to the use of the app, that
we envision in an hypothetical epidemic scenario.
In the event of the activation of the Alert mode for a ver-
ified infected person, the number of people who have
been in contact with them, and thus receiving the alert
and potentially willing to undergo the medical exami-
nation could be very high. The number of notifications
sent will then increase with a cascade effect, damping
the epidemic outbreak. Such scenario could put the
health care system under pressure, due to the great num-
ber of tests requested almost simultaneously. The solu-
tion we suggest is based on two different, but entangled,
approaches.
The first relies on the fact that the app works as a detec-
tor of other devices. In this context we can define strong
and weak interactions.
The strength of the interaction is defined based on both
the duration of the interaction itself and the distance be-
tween the interacting devices. The former can be mea-
sured by keeping track of the period of time two smart-
phones stay within the interacting range, while the lat-
ter can be estimated from the intensity of the Bluetooth
signal at the receiving end. The duration of the interac-
tion can also be used to track multiple contacts with the
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same device, by simply summing the times of the single
interactions.
Introducing a level of intensity of the interaction per-
mits to establish a priority scale, which is directly cor-
related to the probability of infection. People who had
longer interactions with an infected individual, will have
a higher probability of incurring in the infection them-
selves, as well as people who have been much closer to
an infected person.
Once the priority is set, it is used to order the proximal
contact list. At this point, it is possible to proceed by
defining a threshold, taking into account for instance
the capacity of the health care system to perform tests
for the detection of the infection. This way, if the
number of people who can potentially receive the alert
is higher than such threshold, then the individuals with
lower priority are excluded from the list. They can,
for example, be held in a waiting list, and alerted at a
subsequent time.
The second approach that we suggest makes use of two
different kind of alerts, operating in a hierarchical way.
The first, named red notification, corresponds to the
notification system described above: once a person is
tested positive, the proximal contact list of their own
device gets a notification of the contact. The second no-
tification, yellow notification, can be activated by a per-
son who has received the red notification, but not been
tested yet. The yellow notification is sent to the proxi-
mal contact list of this second individual. In the latter
case, the alert must contain indications that are different
compared to those sent with the red notification. For
example, the app would only advise to take precautions
but it would not request the medical examination, unless
a further red notification is received.
We recognize that this last solution might not always
be possible or beneficial, because it could, for exam-
ple, create more confusion in people receiving different
alerts. We envision it as an optional functionality, whose
activation can be authorized or not by the app provider,
depending upon the specific conditions of the epidemic.
3. Encryption and operating scheme
In order to show how it is possible to guarantee privacy
and anonymity, we describe in more detail the encryp-
tion system and the operating scheme we propose for
our app.
We believe that the optimal encryption scheme for an
application like this is the asymmetric encryption.
Asymmetric encryption involves a two-key system: a
public key Kp which is shared between the sender and
the receiver, and a private or secret key Ks which is
known only to the receiver.
The sender, who knows the plain-text message n, gener-
ates the encrypted message n∗ through a ”one-way func-
tion” Cr and a public key Kp.
The receiver, who knows both Kp and Ks keys, is able
to decrypt the message through Dr, the decryption func-
tion.
Kp Kp
↓ ↓
n −→ Cr −→ n∗ 99K n∗ −→ Dr −→ n
↑
Ks
(1)
The strength of this system is that, despite being Kp and
Ks keys dependent on each other, the knowledge of Kp
does not lead back to Ks. Therefore, Cr and Kp alone
do not allow the decryption of n∗.
There are several algorithms that allow asymmetric
encryption. The first of these, most famous and widely
used, is the RSA algorithm [7].
Asymmetric cryptography is the ideal ingredient to de-
velop our recipe. Indeed, each user of the app can be
considered as a sender of information (their phone num-
ber) in the encrypted form n∗. Users interacting with
each other exchange this encrypted information, which
is temporarily registered in the proximal contact list:
L∗j = n∗1, n∗2, ..., n∗i , ..., n∗N (2)
which is absolutely indecipherable for any user.
The whole set of users therefore represents an encrypted
distributed database D∗ which turns out to be really
challenging to break.
D∗ =
⋃
i
L∗i (3)
As previously specified, the user needs an additional key
Km, which is provided by the medical authority, to en-
ables the activation of the Alert mode. Once the Alert
mode is active, the proximal contacts list L∗ is sent to
the decryption server S erver I, which eventually sends
notifications to all the contacts present in the list.
The Km key is generated at the moment of the request
from the authority, by a different server S erver II,
providing the user ID of the person tested positive and
the name of the requesting doctor. In this way, S erver I
only receives data from the j -th user, which is the one
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Figure 4: The diagram shows the operating scheme of the Proximity app and the encryption system.
who is in possession of the km key. This procedure adds
an additional constraint that limits data sharing.
The intrinsic security of such a system relies first of all
in the lack of a central database, since the data is dis-
tributed on all smartphones, in an encrypted form. The
only party able to decrypt the data is the one who gen-
erates the keys, who is also the owner of the system.
However, it is important to underline that they do not
own the data of all the users, but only the small part, of
those who need to be alerted. The asymmetric encryp-
tion algorithm can only be violated with an incredible
computational cost.[7] However, further improvements,
like increasing the size of the keys to a number greater
than 2048 bits and changing the public key often (e.g.
daily), would make the system safe from any possible
reasonable attack.
4. Monte Carlo simulation
Intuitively, it is clear that promptly warning all the prox-
imal contacts of an infected person allows for slowing
down the epidemic. Nonetheless, in order to show the
app efficiency we modeled the functioning of the app
using a simplified Monte Carlo simulation. We have not
modeled the entire evolution of the epidemic, since we
are only interested in the initial phase, the exponential
growth.
Inspired by the SIR model [2], we introduce the quan-
tity R0 the ”basic reproductive rate” as the expected
number of secondary cases directly generated by a
single positive case during the incubation time ∆Tinc.
The quantity R0 represents the crucial parameter which
describes the epidemic evolution.
The idea is that by acting on this coefficient R0, it is
possible to slow down and even stop the epidemic. This
is exactly what the app aims to do; by promptly alert-
ing the infected people, with an adaptive confinement
conceptually described in Fig.(1), the rate of epidemic
growth is significantly reduced.
The assumptions for the Monte Carlo numerical simu-
lation is the following:
• the average incubation period of the disease ∆Tinc
is constant.
• during the incubation period, the ”basic reproduc-
tive rate” R0 is constant.
• the incubation period ∆Tinc is equivalent to the du-
ration of infectiousness. We assume that once the
symptoms appeared the patient is strictly quaran-
tined. Therefore, for any time t > ∆Tinc we set
R Positive0 = 0.
• once an individual receives the alert from the app,
they can start a voluntary quarantine, which de-
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creases R0 of a factor k, R Alert0 = R0/k, and un-
dergoes the test.
• once the epidemic is ongoing, we assume that the
activation of the app into the Alert mode from the
i-th day (corresponding to Tith). Until the i-th day,
the app is in a silent mode: just tracking but not
alerting.
• we assume a linear gradual diffusion of the alert
during the days following the i-th day (this period
is defined Tdelay), in order to roughly model two
events: the progressive mitigation of the sudden
test request, which can hardly be satisfied by the
health care system, and the gradual increase of the
app users number.
We believe that these assumptions can sufficiently de-
scribe the dynamics of the spread of the infection under
the effect of the app.
The results are shown in Fig.(5), the grow of the infec-
tion is exponential as expected, and from the i-th day
the app starts to be activated gradually and the outbreak
drops dramatically.
According to these simulations, the app’s intrinsic effi-
ciency, which is based on the adaptive
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Figure 5: Daily new infected trend according to the model described
in the text. The blue line is the epidemic growth and the red line is
the simulated evolution with the Proximity app. The activation starts
from the 30th day. The grey area represents the number of people
potentially protected. The parameters of the simulation are: ∆Tinc =
14 days, R0 = 3, k = 10, Tith = 30, ∆Tdelay = 10 days. Data have
been averaged over 50 simulations.
confinement/quarantine, seems to be excellent.
On the other hand, the silent assumption that all the in-
fected individuals would be users of the app is not re-
alistic, as well as the assumption that all the possible
infected people could be on the proximity list.
Therefore, in Fig.(6) we show the results of several sim-
ulations with a lower efficiency.
The efficiency could be interpreted in at least two ways,
or a combination of both:
• the fraction of app users with respect to the totality
of infected,
• the fraction of infected individuals that can not be
reached/tracked by the app due to technical rea-
sons, for instance: smartphones shutdown or in-
direct contacts such as those through contaminated
surfaces.
Independent of the former interpretations adopted for
the efficiency, it is relevant to highlight that, according
to our model, with an efficiency of about 60% the app
could still slow down the outbreak very well.
The k parameter represents the effectiveness of the quar-
antine of those who know they have been exposed to a
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Figure 6: Daily new infected trend according to the model described
in the text. Several scenario were evaluated with different values of
efficiency. It is relevant to highlight that with an efficiency of about
60% the app could slow down the outbreak very well. The parameters
of the simulation are: ∆Tinc = 14 days, R0 = 3, k = 10, Tith = 30,
∆Tdelay = 10 days. Data have been averaged over 50 simulations.
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risk of infection, those who have received the alert.
If the alert is completely ignored, the value of the pa-
rameter would be k = 1, instead we expect many people
to consider seriously the contagion risk notification and
intensify the voluntary quarantine and undergo the test
as soon as possible.
These precautions involve an increase in the parameter
k which we assume is probably around the value k = 10.
In Fig. (7) we studied the dependence of our model on
changing the parameter k.
The Tdelay parameter represents the effectiveness and
quickness of the national health system (NHS) in testing
and communicating the outcome to positive patients.
The delay is considered from the day when the Alert
activation protocol is introduced to full operation.
Another cause of this possible delay is the gradual in-
crease in the number of users of the app. We probably
expect a week, ten days.
In Fig. (8) we studied the dependence of our model on
changing the parameter k
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Figure 7: Daily new infected trend according to the model described
in the text. Several scenario were evaluated with different values of
k. It is possible to interpret this parameter as the effectiveness of the
quarantine of those who know they have been exposed to a contagion
risk. Assuming sensible and prudent behavior we expect k  1. The
parameters of the simulation are: ∆Tinc = 14 days, R0 = 3, Tith = 30,
∆Tdelay = 10 days. Data have been averaged over 50 simulations.
5. Discussion
Although to contain the epidemic other apps have been
proposed [10] or are under construction, we believe
that our Proximity app recipe gathers a large number
of advantages. In this section we will try to highlight
its strengths and its weaknesses that require a further
development.
1. All the information about the interactions is
temporarily collected by the app in an encrypted
list.
2. The app does not require any central database, all
the data are distributed in the local storage of the
smartphones. Only the proximal contact list of
people certified as infected are sent to a remote
server to be decrypted to allow contacts to be
notified anonymously.
3. Proximal contacts are detected directly and with an
offline system: there is no need of an internet con-
nection at this stage.
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Figure 8: Daily new infected trend according to the model described
in the text. Several scenario were evaluated with different values of
∆Tdelay. It is possible to interpret this parameter as the effectiveness of
the NHS in testing patients and promptly reporting the positives. The
parameters of the simulation are: ∆Tinc = 14 days, R0 = 3, k = 10,
Tith = 30. Data have been averaged over 50 simulations.
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4. A direct detection of the proximal contact is
potentially more accurate than the geolocation,
and it can be carried out in places where satellite
coverage is absent or scarce. Thanks to the
intensity of the signal, the proximity radius can be
tuned more precisely.
Further development of mobile phones technology
can help to improving these aspects.
5. The possibility of alerting unknown people di-
rectly and in complete anonymity.
6. To avoid spreading unwanted or fake alerts, the
activation of the alert can happen only thanks to
a key provided by the medical authority who
certifies the case of epidemic contagion.
7. The app is relatively simple, low energy con-
suming, low memory and low computational cost
are required. On the other hand, it requires at
least a solid encryption system, the development
of a brand new communication system with the
current technology available (Bluetooth) and an
anonymous way to send the alert (preferably via a
SMS).
8. The app provides a system of priorities based on
the duration and the distance of the contact, which
enhances its efficiency and lowers the numbers of
false alerts.
9. The app can be disabled when there is no ongoing
epidemic. A warning to switch on the app should
be send in case of epidemic risk. Furthermore,
the app can be temporarily disabled by the user or
paused at his discretion.
6. Conclusions
We believe that protecting humanity from epidemics is
of crucial importance and of interest to all.
For this reason, we are sure that a system like the one
we have proposed will inevitably be adopted in the fu-
ture. The hope is that this will happen in the shortest
time possible and especially in respect of rights like pri-
vacy and freedom. We believe this solution may be use-
ful in particular in the current COVID-19 pandemic and
moreover could be used to prevent similar events in the
future.
7. Statement
The authors claim to have developed the content of this
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aged in TraceTogheter [11].
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